Can a Child Born in China (Foreign Country) Be Legally Adopted in Malaysia Without a Malaysian Birth Certificate?

A Malaysian couple had raised a young girl born in China as their own child for many years. When they eventually decided to formalise the relationship through a legal adoption order, their application was rejected by the Sessions Court—not because the child was being poorly cared for, and not because the Welfare Department opposed the adoption, but because of a procedural issue concerning the child’s birth certificate. The case eventually reached the High Court in Penang, where the decision was overturned and the adoption was allowed. The case raises an important question for prospective adoptive parents: can the absence of a Malaysian birth certificate prevent the legal adoption of a child who was born overseas?

The case is Lau Keng Ee & Anor v Gao Qiao Zhe Sheng & Anor [2026] MLJU 1893 (Case No. PA-12B-48-11/2025).

The story began in 2010, when a relative of the wife in Liaoning, China, went through a breakdown of her marriage and was left with a young daughter born in 2007. In an effort to provide the child with a stable family environment, the Malaysian couple eventually brought the girl to Penang in 2017 and raised her as their own daughter. The wife, a full-time homemaker, devoted herself to caring for the child, while the husband provided financial support and arranged for her to receive an education at a reputable private school. By the time the adoption application was made, the child had already spent many years living as part of the family.

The Welfare Department subsequently conducted an investigation in its capacity as the court-appointed guardian ad litem. Its report was highly favourable and confirmed that the family environment was stable, loving and harmonious. From the perspective of the child’s welfare, there appeared to be little reason to disrupt the family relationship that had developed over the years.

With this report, the couple filed an adoption application in the Sessions Court in March 2025. However, in October 2025, the Sessions Court dismissed the application.

The difficulty arose from the operation of section 25A of the Adoption Act 1952. The provision contemplates the surrender of the child’s existing birth certificate to the National Registration Department following an adoption order, so that a replacement birth certificate can be issued without indicating that the child had been adopted.

The Sessions Court took the view that this procedure created a legal difficulty in the present case because the child had been born in China and did not possess a Malaysian birth certificate. Since there was no Malaysian birth certificate that could be surrendered and replaced, the court considered the adoption procedure legally defective.

The Sessions Court also questioned whether the couple had sufficiently established that the child was “ordinarily resident” in Malaysia. In particular, the court considered that the affidavits filed by the couple did not provide sufficiently specific dates and details to establish the child’s residence.

The couple appealed to the High Court in Penang.

The High Court ultimately overturned the Sessions Court’s decision and granted the adoption order. In doing so, Justice Choong Yeow Choy emphasised that adoption proceedings cannot be approached purely as a mechanical exercise in administrative compliance. The court must consider the fundamental purpose of adoption law—the welfare of the child.

First, the court recognised that the central purpose of adoption law is to protect the child’s welfare and facilitate a stable and secure family environment. The Welfare Department had already investigated the family and found that the child was being raised in a loving and harmonious home. In those circumstances, an administrative difficulty concerning the replacement of a birth certificate should not be allowed to defeat an otherwise appropriate adoption application.

The purpose of an administrative procedure is to facilitate the operation of the law, not to create an obstacle that defeats the very protection the law is intended to provide.

Secondly, the High Court examined the legislative history of section 25A by referring to the parliamentary Hansard from 2000. The court noted that the provision was introduced, among other reasons, to remove the word “adoption” from the child’s replacement birth certificate. This was intended to protect adopted children from stigma and discrimination and to safeguard their psychological and social well-being.

Importantly, the parliamentary debates also made clear that the Adoption Act was not intended to be limited to children born in Malaysia. Foreign-born children could also fall within the scope of the adoption law. Therefore, the fact that a child was born overseas and did not possess a Malaysian birth certificate should not, by itself, be treated as a fatal legal obstacle to an adoption application.

In other words, the absence of a Malaysian birth certificate was a procedural and administrative issue that could be addressed, rather than a substantive defect that automatically prevented the court from granting an adoption order.

The High Court also rejected the concern regarding the child’s ordinary residence in Malaysia. The adoptive parents had stated in their affidavits that the child was living in Penang. The Welfare Department did not file any affidavit contradicting those assertions. Where facts have been positively stated and are not challenged by contrary evidence, the court may accept them on the evidence before it.

The High Court therefore allowed the appeal and granted the adoption order.

The significance of Lau Keng Ee & Anor v Gao Qiao Zhe Sheng & Anor goes beyond the particular family involved. The decision highlights an important principle in adoption law: administrative requirements should not be interpreted in a manner that defeats the welfare of the child, which lies at the heart of the adoption process.

For prospective adoptive parents considering the adoption of a child born overseas, the case is particularly significant. The absence of a Malaysian birth certificate does not necessarily mean that the child cannot be legally adopted in Malaysia. The court must consider the purpose of the legislation, the welfare of the child and whether the relevant administrative requirements can reasonably be addressed, rather than treating a documentary difficulty as an automatic bar to adoption.

This does not mean that every application involving a foreign-born child will automatically succeed. Each adoption application must still be considered on its own facts, including the child’s residence, the family circumstances, welfare considerations and the applicable statutory requirements. Proper documentation and clear evidence of the child’s residence in Malaysia therefore remain extremely important.

Ultimately, the message from Lau Keng Ee & Anor v Gao Qiao Zhe Sheng & Anor is straightforward: legal procedures exist to protect children, not to turn administrative difficulties into barriers that prevent children from obtaining a stable and secure family.